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TORTS-FRAUD AND DECEIT-INSPECTION BY
VENDEE AS BAR TO RECOVERY
Vendor owned a large, old house heated by a steam, coal-
fired furnace. An explosion in the furnace caused serious damage
to it, which was, however, not apparent to a layman. The price
of the residence, which had been listed for sale prior to the explo-
sion, was appreciably reduced inasmuch as vendor informed
her broker of some trouble with the furnace and also of her
physical inability to keep it operating. During an inspection of
the house the vendee noted that the house was cold and asked
the agent if there was anything wrong with the furnace. He
was informed that there was nothing wrong with the furnace,
that it was in good shape although something was wrong with
the controls, and that the reason the house was cold was the
physical inability of vendor to fill the hopper. Vendee testified
that vendor also told him personally that there was nothing
wrong with the furnace. He looked inside the furnace, which was
full of ashes and soot, and then made an offer and signed the re-
sulting contract. A few days later vendee obtained the key to the
house and had the furnace examined by an expert, who after a
superficial examination advised that the controls could be re-
paired at a nominal expense. Vendee then performed his part
of the contract. Soon thereafter while having the furnace
cleaned, vendee discovered for the first time a large crack in the
furnace. This action resulted with a jury verdict in favor of ven-
dee for damages. On appeal, held, reversed and final judgment
for vendor. Where vendee was given opportunity to make full
and complete examination of true condition of furnace, -vendee
cannot claim that misrepresentation induced him to purchase
the house. Poe v. Voss, 196 Va. 821, 86 S.E.2d 47 (1955).
(Eggleston and Miller, JJ., were not present; Buchanan and
Smith, JJ., dissented.)
The Court said that the obvious condition of the furnace
and the agent's statements, even if the vendee's version be ac-
cepted (which the jury did), were sufficient to excite the sus-
picions of a reasonable, prudent man, and they did, for vendee
asked for and was given opportunity to examine the furnace.
Under these circumstances it was the vendee's duty to take ad-
vantage of the opportunity and ascertain the true condition of
the premises and having failed to do so he cannot now avail him-
self of the alleged misrepresentations. It is said that the law gives
no remedy for voluntary negligence in failing to make inquiry re-
garding the true status of affairs,' and if a purchaser does not
rely on the representations of the seller but seeks information
from other sources, the law will often impute to him all the
knowledge necessary to a proper understanding of the facts.2
Although the guilty party to a contract obtained by false repre-
sentations cannot rely upon the fact that the party defrauded
might have learned the trouble by proper inquiry, yet, if the
party defrauded institutes inquiry for himself and ascertains the
trouble, or if the means of knowledge are pointed out to him and
an opportunity is given to make the necessary investigation and
he thereby acquires some information concerning the actual facts,
he cannot rely upon the falsity of such representations. 3 How-
ever, when the seller has made a false representation which from
its nature might induce the buyer to enter into the contract on the
faith of it, it will be inferred that the buyer was thereby induced
to contract. To remove this inference the seller must prove either
that the buyer had knowledge of facts which showed the repre-
sentations to be untrue or that he expressly stated in terms or
showed by his conduct that he did not rely upon the represen-
tations, but acted on his own judgment. Furthermore, the ven-
dee is not deprived of his right to relief merely because he had
the means of discovering that the representation was false.4 The
law is well-settled that if one represents as true that which is
really false in such a way as to induce a reasonable man to be-
lieve it, and the representation is meant to be acted on, and he
to whom the representation was made, believing it to be true,
acts on it, and in consequence thereof sustains damage-there
is such fraud as will support an action for deceit at law.3 Evi-
dently the jury did not believe that the parties were on equal
footing or that the vendee had ascertained the truth or that the
means of knowledge were pointed out to him, but rather the
jury thought that the vendor had induced the vendee to buy by
1 Costello v. Larsen, 182 Va. 567, 29 S.E.2d 856 (1944).
'Grim v. Byrd, 32 Gratt. (73 Va.) 293 (1879).$West End Co. v. Clairbourne, 87 Va. 734, 34 S.E. 900 (1900).
&Wilson v. Carpenter 91 Va. 183, 21 S.E. 243 (1895).5 Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va. 824, 27 S.E.2d 198 (1943).
a false misrepresentation upon which vendee relied and awarded
damages to the vendee accordingly.
It has been repeatedly held that a verdict fairly rendered
ought not to be interfered with by the court unless manifest
wrong and injustice have been done or unless the verdict is
plainly not warranted by the evidence.6 The jury's findings
should not be disturbed even though if the Court of Appeals
had been the trier of the facts it would not have so found.7 A
verdict for the plaintiff approved by the trial court requires the
appellate court in its review of the case to look only to so much
of the evidence as is favorable to the plaintiff,8 and such a ver-
dict cannot be disturbed unless it is wholly without evidence to
support it or is so plainly wrong as to leave no doubt upon the
subject.9 The trial court, which has heard the witnesses testify,
is in a better position to pass on the weight to be attached to
their testimony than the appellate court, and the action of the
trial court in declining to interfere with the findings of the jury
is entitled to weight in the appellate court.10 The credibility of
the witnesses, the weight of evidence and conflicting inferences
therefrom were questions for the jury, and the trial court having
entered judgment upon the verdict for plaintiff, it could not be
said that the judgment or verdict was plainly wrong or without
evidence to support it.1 A verdict based on credible evidence
and sustained by the trial court, must be sustained by the Court
of Appeals 12 and where a party litigant comes to the Court of
Appeals fortified by the verdict of a jury, approved by the trial
court, he occupies the strongest position known to the law.13
Appellate courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set
aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn
different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that
other results are more reasonable, 14 and upon review the court
should view the case in effect as upon a demurrer to the evi-
dence.' 5 In the instant case it appears that the decision in the
* Rauch & Co. 7. Graham Mfg. Corp., 145 Va. 681, 134 S.E. 692 (1926).
Smith v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 800, 40 S.E.2d 273 (1946).
SWoodmen of the World Life Ins. Soc. v. Grant, 185 Va. 288, 38 S.E.2d 450 (1946).
United States Fidelity Co. v. Country Club, 129 Va. 306, 105 S.E. 686 (1921).
10 Kritselis v. Petty. 129 Va. 175, 105 S.E. 536 (1921).
21 Director General v. Gordon, 134 Va. 381, 114 S.E. 668 (1922).12Johnson v. Kincheloe, 164 Va. 370, 180 S.E. 540 (1935).
lea, v. Spencer, 181 Va. 668, 26 S.E.2d 70 (1943).
16 Burrell v. Burrell 193 Va 594, 70 S.E.2d 316 (1952).
25 Olds v. Woods 0~6 Va. 940, 86 S.E.2d 32 (195 ).
trial court was reversed solely because the vendee had an oppor-
tunity to examine the furnace even though he did not discover its
malfunction until after performance of the contract and regard-
less of the fact that the vendor induced the sale by a misrepre-
sentation as to the condition of the furnace.
The Court also seems to stress heavily the significance of the
fact that an expert was brought in by vendee to look at the fur-
nace although this was done after the contract was signed. If,
however, the vendee learned of the defects from his expert, he
was not thereby barred from asserting fraud by the vendor but
still had the right to elect to take the property under the con-
tract and bring his action for the alleged deceit.16
The weight of authority in the United States upholds the
view that contributory negligence is no defense when the de-
fendant has intentionally misrepresented facts in order to induce
the plaintiff to enter into a business transaction. This view is in
line with the general legal principle that contributory negli-
gence is no defense to an intentional tort. The fact that the
plaintiff might have discovered the truth upon investigation is
not a defense available to a deceitful defendant.17 It seems that
the decision in this case is contra to the majority view and not
in keeping with the progress the law has steadily made in the
general field of protection of the bona fide purchaser and the
curtailment of sharp practices. It is conceivable that much
abuse will be fostered by this strict interpretation of a well-
established legal principle. How can any well-meaning and
honest buyer rely on any representation by his vendor if he has
seen the subject matter? Take a hypothetical case in which the
vendee asks the vendor whether the roof leaks and vendor as-
sures vendee that it does not, while in reality it is a virtual col-
ander. On the basis of the rule expressed in the Poe case the
vendee is barred to assert fraud on the part of vendor if he has
seen the roof on a clear day. Evidently the Court would feel that
16 Wilson v. Hundley, 96 Va. 96, 30 S.E. 492 (1898).1 7Lewis v .Jewell, 151 Mass. 34S, 24 N.E. 52, 21 Am.St.Rep. 4S4(1890); Fargo Gas
and Coke Co. v. Fargo Gas and Electric Co., 4 N.D. 219. 39 N.W. 1066 37 LILA.
593 (1894); Handy v. Waldren 18 R.I 567, 29 A. 143, 49 AnLSt.Rep. 94 (1894),
19 R.I 618 35 A 884 (1896$; Halsel v. First National Bank of Muskogee 48
Okla. 535, 150 P. 489, 1916 L.R.A. 1697 (1915); McCarthy v. Reid. 237 Mass.
371, 129 N.E. 675, 12 A.L.R. 1000 (1924); Feruson v. Koch, 204 CaL2d. 342, 268
P. 342, 58 A.L.R. 176 (1928); Seeser v. Odle. 18 Cal.2d 409, 115 P.2d 977. 136
A.L.R. 1291 (1941).
the parties are on equal terms in this case, as it is analogous in
my opinion to the case under comment. It would be preferable
if the definition of equal footing should include an awareness
by both parties of all the material facts available so that any
subsequent transaction between them would be limited only by
their personal judgment.
The doctrine of caveat emptor has mellowed with age and
as a principle should be valid only in the absence of fraudulent
misrepresentation. As long ago as 1899 it was said that the rule
of caveat emptor is not founded on the highest standards of
morals and that it is no longer a shield and protection to the
deliberate frauds and cheats of sharpers.18 Everyone still ad-
mires a hard bargain but only if it is free of fraud. No rogue
should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder for the simple reason that his
victim is by chance a fool.19 There is a great difference between
offering a house for sale "as is" and making a sale based on and
induced by misrepresentation and fraud, regardless of the lay-
man's casual observations soothed by his vendor's assurances.
Progressive, prosperous enterprises do not resort to this type
of sale. This fact further lulls an unsuspecting public into a
false sense of financial security.
It is submitted that a more equitable result would have been
reached in this three-to-two decision if the Court had adopted
as its own the dissenting opinion written by Mr. Justice Bu-
chanan.
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